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Abstract
In this paper, we examine the stability of international macroeconomic policies of
developing countries in the post-Bretton Woods period. We use the simple geometry
of the classic, open-economy trilemma to construct a new, univariate measure of inter-
national macroeconomic policy stability, and to characterize international macroeco-
nomic arrangements in terms of their semblance to deﬁnitive policy archetypes; and,
we use the trilemma constraint to provide a new gauge of monetary sovereignty. Using
these measures, we ﬁnd that the greatest international macroeconomic stability among
developing economies exists where there are capital controls and limited exchange rate
ﬂexibility. The least stable policies occur in the economies with ﬂexible exchange rates
and open ﬁnancial markets. We also ﬁnd that oﬃcial holdings of foreign exchange re-
serves seem to be weakly linked to greater policy stability, and their link is further
weakened where ﬁnancial markets are open.
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In this paper, we examine the stability of international macroeconomic policies in devel-
oping economies. To do so, we construct a new, formal measure of stability. Applying the
new measure to 93 poor and lower-middle income economies in the modern (post-Bretton
Woods) era, we ﬁnd that the most stable international macroeconomic policies exist in
economies with relatively ﬁxed exchange rates and in those with relatively high barriers to
international ﬁnancial openness. Correspondingly, among poor and lower-middle income
economies, policies of ﬂexible exchange rates and open ﬁnancial markets exhibit the least
stability. We also examine the link between international macroeconomic policy stability
and foreign exchange reserves. We ﬁnd that the two are correlated, and we document that
foreign exchange reserves are (weakly) linked to policy stability when they are combined
with exchange rate stability and low levels of ﬁnancial openness.
Our new measure of international macroeconomic policy stability starts with the clas-
sic, open-economy trilemma that potentially constrains the exchange rate policies, inter-
national capital market access, and monetary policies of all countries. According to the
trilemma, a country cannot simultaneously achieve exchange rate stability, capital market
openness, and monetary sovereignty. The trilemma thus suggests that we can think of an
individual country’s international macroeconomic policies in terms of a location in a con-
strained three-dimensional space, one that is deﬁned by exchange rate stability, ﬁnancial
openness, and monetary sovereignty. In this framework, the change in a country’s inter-
national macroeconomic policy is naturally measured as a movement from one point to
another in the three-dimensional policy space. Here, we gauge a country’s policy stability
using the extent of the changes. Speciﬁcally, overall stability or instability is measured by
the distances between the sequential locations in the policy space. A stable international
macroeconomic policy is deﬁned as one with small movements within the policy space;
while large movements within the policy space represent unstable policies.
We also provide a new measure of monetary sovereignty. The new measure is derived
from the trilemma’s constraint: the trilemma constrains monetary sovereignty to come at
the expense of reductions in exchange rate stability and ﬁnancial openness.1 Given mea-
sures of exchange rate stability and ﬁnancial openness, the trilemma’s constraint yields
1In related, exploratory work, we examine a similarly construct implicit measure of ﬁnancial openness.
1an implicit measure of monetary sovereignty. This new measure provides a distinct al-
ternative to the now-standard measures that rely on the correlation between a country’s
interest rate with the interest rate of a base country. Using the new monetary sovereignty
measure, we conﬁrm the ﬁndings described above, but we also ﬁnd that the international
macroeconomic policies of poor and lower-middle income economies appear to be more
stable than would be suggested by a standard measure, which generally also implies less
sovereignty than is indicated by our new measure.
In the remainder of this paper, we ﬁrst introduce our new measure of stability. Next,
we use this measure to gauge the stability of the trilemma among poor and lower-middle
income economies, and in doing so we rely on our new measure of monetary sovereignty.
Then, we examine how stability is related to the underlying policies and to reserves.
Finally, we conclude with a discussion of the approach of the paper and the implications
that it has for our assessments of the exchange rate arrangements and other international
macroeconomic policies of developing countries.
2 A Stability Measure
To gauge stability, we begin with the international trilemma’s standard triad of policies.
We denote the ith country’s extant regime in period t as Ri,t,w h e r e :
Ri,t =( Si,t,F i,t,M i,t),
and Si,t represents exchange rate stability, Fi,t represents ﬁnancial openness, and Mi,t
represents monetary sovereignty. The measures of Si,t, Fi,t, and Mi,t, are normalized so
that each falls between zero and one (inclusive); and values of one represent perfectly
sovereign monetary policy, perfectly open ﬁnancial markets, and perfectly ﬁxed exchange
rates. So, a pure ﬁx with open ﬁnancial markets is: Ri,t =( 1 ,1,0); a pure ﬁx with
monetary sovereignty is Ri,t =( 1 ,0,1), and a pure ﬂoat with open capital markets and
monetary sovereignty is Ri,t =( 0 ,1,1).
In this framework, a change in the country’s regime from one period to the next is
simply the vector connecting the two consecutive points in the policy space:
2ri,t = Ri,t − Ri,t−1
=( si,t,f i,t,m i,t)=( Si,t − Si,t−1,F i,t − Fi,t−1,M i,t − Mi,t−1).
Using this vector of policy changes, ri,t, we can deﬁnitively measure the overall change
in policy using the vector’s norm, ||ri,t||.2 Using the norm, we deﬁne a single, univariate






This simple scalar, ni,t, captures the full extent of the change in a country’s triad of
international macroeconomic policies.3
Figure 1 illustrates this approach to measuring policy stability. The ﬁgure displays
the data underlying a single observation of the measure, ni,t; namely, that of Indonesia
during the time of the Asian Crisis (i = Indonesia, and t = 1997). As is well-known,
Indonesia experienced a substantial drop in its exchange rate stability and a small drop
in its ﬁnancial openness during the crisis, while it increased its monetary sovereignty
considerably. These changes are indicated by the vector shown between the observations
for 1996 and for 1997.4 The normalized length of the vector measures the overall change
in the policy triad. In this case, ni,t =0 .578. This is a large change: it is about ﬁve
times the values typical of Indonesia earlier in the decade, and it exceeds (by a substantial
margin) 95 percent of the values in the sample.
In general, the norm of the vector summarizes the overall changes in the international
macroeconomic policies of the trilemma. Below, we use the norm (adjusted to fall between
zero and one) to examine the stability of various policies and to assess the extent to which
stability may be linked to oﬃcial holdings of foreign exchange reserves.
2We use the Euclidean norm (henceforth, in this paper, the norm).
3By providing a univariate gauge of multivariate changes in policies, our new measure follows Girton
and Roper’s (1977) ‘exchange market pressure’ measure. Although lacking the norm’s clear, geometric
interpretation, their classic measure provides an early, univariate amalgam of foreign exchange policies.
4As discussed in more detail below, we use data from Aizenman, Chinn, and Ito (2010). The cartesian
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Figure 1: Indonesia 1996–97
3 Data and Overall Stability
In this section, we calculate the new stability measure for the full sample. We begin
with the de facto exchange rate stability and monetary sovereignty measures provided by
Aizenman, Chinn, and Ito (2010), updated with the latest version of the de jure ﬁnancial
account openness measure of Chinn and Ito (2008). Then, we recalculate our measure
of stability using an alternative gauge of monetary sovereignty. Using data from 1970 to
2008, we focus on the experience of developing economies by including only the countries
in the Aizenman, Chinn, and Ito dataset that were designated by the World Bank in 2008
as being poor or lower middle income countries – that is, those whose annual per capita
GDP was $3855 or less. These countries are listed in Appendix A.
Aizenman et. al. construct the annual measure of exchange rate stability, Si,t,u s i n g
the exchange rate’s monthly standard deviation against a base country.5 Like many other
researchers, they follow Shambaugh (2004) in constructing monetary sovereignty measures,
Mi,t, using the correlation between each country’s money market interest rate and that of
its base country. Finally, Chinn and Ito’s de jure measure of ﬁnancial market openness,
Fi,t, is essentially a weighted average of the International Monetary Fund’s indicators of
5Like others, Aizenman, Chinn, and Ito apply a threshold to the standard deviation method in order to
capture the stability of those currencies that remain in narrow bands; and, they also allow for individual
devaluations or revaluations. The base countries include Australia, Belgium, France, Germany, India,
Malaysia, South Africa, the United Kingdom, and the United States.
4exchange restrictions.6
Table 1 provides a summary of the adjusted norms, ni,t, calculated using these data
on developing economies. The statistics are broken down by region, and they are com-
pared with the summary statistics for the rest of the world. As shown in the second and
third columns, the adjusted norms range from zero to 0.73 in our sample of developing
economies. Notably, there is little apparent diﬀerence between the policy stability among
developing economies and that in the rest of the world. As shown in the table’s last two
rows, both the mean and the maximum for developing economies are very close to the
corresponding values for the rest of the world. However, among developing economies, the
values do diﬀer signiﬁcantly across regions. The averages are largest in east Asia and the
Paciﬁc, and in eastern Europe and central Asia. The average is smallest for the sub Saha-
ran African countries. The adjusted norms – both overall and by region – are graphed in
Figure 2, where the dashed lines correspond to the measure discussed so far and to Table
1. The graphs’ solid lines correspond to a second, closely related measure of stability – one
that substitutes an implicit measure of monetary sovereignty for the Shambaugh measure
used by Aizenman, Chinn, and Ito.
4 Other, Related Measures and Tests
4.1 An Implicit Measure of Monetary Sovereignty
As discussed above, the Shambaugh approach to gauging monetary sovereignty uses the
correlation between a country’s domestic, short-term interest rate and that of a putative
base country, often the United States. High correlations are taken as indicative of monetary
dependence. (That is, they are taken as a lack of monetary sovereignty.) Unfortunately,
these otherwise valuable measures entail a drawback: in addition to reﬂecting monetary
dependence, they also reﬂect the correlations between the underlying circumstances to
6Speciﬁcally, Chinn and Ito measure ﬁnancial openness with the ﬁrst principal component of the IMF’s
binary indicators of restrictions on current and capital account transactions, of multiple exchange rates,
and of the required surrender of export proceeds. This is also the measure subsequently used by Aizenman
et. al.. Miniane (2004) provides a de jure index that uses ﬁner IMF data on capital account restrictions,
but Miniane’s data are available for only thirty countries. Many other, related, de jure indices have been
developed, but few blend the easy interpretation and the wide coverage that Chinn and Ito provide. The


































































2:81 2:86 2:91 2:96 2::1 2::6 3111 3116
Sftu!pg!uif!Xpsme
Figure 2: Norms by Region
6Table 1: Norm using Shambaugh (2004)
Mean Max. Min. St. Dev. Obs. H0
East Asia & Paciﬁc 0.15 0.69 0.00 0.13 341 −3.37(***)
Europe & Central Asia 0.16 0.63 0.01 0.10 94 −2.71(***)
Latin America & Caribbean 0.14 0.73 0.00 0.15 274 −1.84(*)
Middle East & North Africa 0.14 0.68 0.00 0.13 186 −1.08
South Asia 0.14 0.60 0.00 0.12 228 −1.22
Sub-Saharan Africa 0.11 0.72 0.00 0.11 1131 6.07(***)
Developing 0.13 0.73 0.00 0.12 2254 −1.01
R.o.W. 0.12 0.75 0.00 0.11 2453 –
Notes: See Appendix A for a list of countries by region. The last column reports the value of the
t-statistic for a test of equality of each region’s mean against the mean of all other developing
countries in the sample. The last two rows report descriptive statistics and a t-test for the
developing sample against the rest of the world (R.o.W.). R.o.W. includes upper middle and
higher income countries. (*) denotes signiﬁcance at the 10% level; (**) at the 5% level; (***) at
the 1% level.
which independent monetary policies may respond.7 Other researchers, such as Frankel,
Schmukler, and Serven (2004, in work contemporaneous with Shambaugh’s), and Reade
and Volz (2008), provide related measures of monetary sovereignty that allow for more
general dynamic links between the interest rates of the countries. However, even these
more general measures ultimately rely on interest rate comovements, so they are subject
to the same drawback.8
Here, we introduce an alternative measure of monetary sovereignty that does not suﬀer
from this drawback, and we use the new measure to recalculate our gauge of stability, ni,t.
Our new measure of monetary sovereignty starts by taking the trilemma seriously: we
assume that the trilemma holds. With that assumption, the existing measures of exchange
rate stability, Si,t, and of ﬁnancial openness, Fi,t, provide us with an implicit measure of
monetary sovereignty, Mi,t. Speciﬁcally, the implicit measure of monetary sovereignty is:
Mi,t =2− Si,t − Fi,t.
7Canada provides a telling example of the measure’s problem: despite Canada’s own demonstrable
monetary sovereignty, its interest rates are highly correlated with those of the United States. Taken at
face value, this approach would say that the Bank of Canada echoes the policies of the Federal Reserve
Board.
8Two other, more recent studies take important steps toward mitigating the problem. Duburcq and
Girardin (2010) allow domestic monetary conditions to matter in a study of eight Latin American countries
over eleven years. Bluedorn and Bowdler (2010) separate the anticipated and unanticipated components
of the base country’s interest rate changes using the U.S. as the base country.
7Table 2: Norm using the Trilemma-Implied Monetary Sovereignty Measure
Mean Max. Min. St. Dev. Obs. H0
East Asia & Paciﬁc 0.13 0.70 0.00 0.16 414 −4.17(***)
Europe & Central Asia 0.14 0.70 0.00 0.12 101 −2.92(***)
Latin America & Caribbean 0.12 0.77 0.00 0.18 357 −2.02(**)
Middle East & North Africa 0.10 0.88 0.00 0.16 292 −0.05
South Asia 0.11 0.61 0.00 0.14 259 −0.99
Sub-Saharan Africa 0.08 0.76 0.00 0.13 1326 6.09(***)
Developing 0.10 0.88 0.00 0.15 2749 0.44
R.o.W. 0.10 0.94 0.00 0.14 2633 –
Notes: Same as in Table 1.
Figure 3 provides graphs that depict both this implicit measure of monetary sovereignty
(the solid lines), along with the Shambaugh measure (the dashed lines).9 Overall, the
new, implicit measure suggests a greater degree of monetary sovereignty than does the
Shambaugh measure.
Since this implicit measure of monetary sovereignty takes the trilemma as given, we
cannot use it to test the trilemma’s validity, which is what Aizenman, Chinn, and Ito
test.10 However, we can use the implicit measure to explore what is of interest to us here:
policy stability, which we can still gauge using the adjusted norm, ni,t.
Table 2 provides a summary of policy stability using the adjusted norms calculated with
the new, implied measure of monetary policy. The regional comparisons are essentially
the same: the economies in east Asia and the Paciﬁc, and in eastern Europe and central
Asia have the largest means, while the countries of sub Saharan Africa have the smallest
means. The regional diﬀerences are again statistically signiﬁcant. Using the new measure,
the average policy changes are smaller; though the maxima are larger. The slight (and
statistically insigniﬁcant) diﬀerence between the stability in the developing economies and
the stability in the rest of the world diminishes even further.
4.2 Stability over Time
The graphs in Figure 2 were suggestive of some possible changes over time in the stability
of policy. Table 3 examines whether some of the seeming changes in stability are statisti-
9In cases where the implicit measure would yield a value in excess of one, we have equated the measure
with one.
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Figure 3: Implicit and Shambaugh (2004) Measures of Monetary Sovereignty
9Table 3: Implicit Norm Means Before and After Recent Crises, 1994 (Mexico), 1997








































Notes: The last column reports the value of the t-statistic for a test of the hypothesis that the
two means (before and after the relevant breakpoint) are equal. (*) denotes signiﬁcance at the
10% level; (**) at the 5% level; (***) at the 1% level.
cally signiﬁcant. Speciﬁcally, the table provides tests of whether the mean adjusted norm
remained the same after the key crises that occur in the sample: the Mexican Crisis (1994),
the Southeast Asian Crisis (1997), and the Argentinean Crisis (2002). Here, and unless
otherwise indicated below, we now calculate the norms using the new, trilemma-implied
measure of monetary stability.
As the table shows, in most cases, we cannot reject the hypothesis that there was no
change in the mean. There are three notable exceptions. First, the policies in east Asian
and Paciﬁc economies seem to be more stable now than in the past: the mean norm in the
east Asian and Paciﬁc economies declined signiﬁcantly after the Asian crisis. The decline
is also detectable (though less markedly) if the Argentinean Crisis is given as the break
point. Second, trilemma stability has declined in sub Saharan African countries: no matter
10which of the three breaks point is used, their mean norm has risen signiﬁcantly. Finally,
while there is no overall change in the measured stability of the trilemma policies in the
developing economies when taken as a whole (with east Asia and the Paciﬁc’s stability
increase oﬀsetting Africa’s stability decline), the trilemma policies in the rest of the world
do seem to have become more stable, regardless of which of the three break points is used.
4.3 Large Norms
When it comes to policy stability, it is arguably the very large changes in policy that are
of most interest. So, we separately examine the incidence of large observations. Table
4 provides data on the largest decile of adjusted norms. The table lists the number of
these large observations in each year, by region, for the full sample, and for the rest of the
world. For each cell in the table, the numerator in the table gives the number of the large
observations, while the denominator gives the total number of observations.
Among developing economies, the large changes echo the means. It is again the eastern
European and central Asian economies, along with the east Asian and Paciﬁc economies
that exhibit the least stable policies. Likewise, by these measures, it is again the sub
Saharan African countries that exhibit the greatest policy stability. When comparing
developing economies with the rest of the world, however, a diﬀerence that could not be
seen in the means does arise here: somewhat more (and a greater percentage of) large
policy changes arise in the developing economies. In the regressions later, we ﬁrst examine
all the policy changes, then we focus on the probability of a large change in policy.
4.4 Archetypes
Next, we explore how the norms diﬀer across the types of international macroeconomic
arrangements. We assign observations to four diﬀerent types of arrangements based on
their semblance to one of four “archetypes:” a Hong-Kong-type, with exchange rate sta-
bility and open capital markets; a China-type, with exchange rate stability and monetary
sovereignty; a U.S.-type with open ﬁnancial markets and monetary sovereignty; and a
Middle-type, with a modest degree of all three characteristics.
We use the simple geometry of the trilemma to describe the types of arrangements
more formally. Letting j= “Hong Kong”, “China”, “U.S.”, “Middle”, we deﬁne typej
11Table 4: Number of Implicit Norm Values in the Last Decile by Region
Year











1971 2/6 na 0/9 1/7 2/5 12/27 17/54 10/49
1972 1/6 na 0/9 1/7 2/5 3/28 7/55 8/49
1973 0/6 na 1/9 2/7 0/5 12/29 15/56 19/51
1974 2/7 na 0/9 1/7 1/5 3/30 7/58 4/52
1975 1/5 na 0/9 1/7 0/5 2/30 4/56 6/51
1976 2/5 na 0/9 1/7 0/5 1/30 4/56 9/52
1977 1/5 na 0/8 0/7 0/6 1/30 2/56 6/56
1978 0/5 na 1/8 0/7 2/6 3/30 6/56 9/59
1979 1/5 na 0/8 1/7 1/6 1/30 4/56 7/59
1980 1/6 na 1/8 1/7 0/6 2/31 5/58 4/60
1981 2/7 na 2/8 0/7 0/6 1/31 5/59 4/60
1982 2/8 na 1/8 0/7 2/6 2/34 7/63 4/62
1983 3/9 na 1/8 0/8 1/7 1/35 6/67 7/64
1984 2/9 na 2/8 0/8 0/7 3/35 7/67 4/66
1985 1/10 na 1/9 0/8 1/7 1/36 4/70 5/66
1986 1/11 na 1/10 0/8 1/8 3/36 6/73 7/67
1987 5/11 na 1/10 0/8 0/8 0/36 6/73 4/69
1988 0/11 na 1/10 0/8 0/8 1/36 2/73 2/69
1989 0/11 na 2/10 0/8 0/8 0/38 2/75 4/70
1990 2/12 na 2/10 0/8 2/8 1/38 7/76 2/70
1991 0/13 na 5/10 1/8 0/8 1/37 7/76 1/70
1992 1/13 na 2/10 1/8 4/8 1/37 9/76 4/70
1993 0/13 na 3/10 0/8 2/8 0/37 5/76 10/71
1994 1/13 na 2/10 1/8 3/8 4/38 11/77 9/71
1995 3/13 na 1/10 0/7 3/7 3/38 10/75 4/73
1996 5/15 0/1 3/10 3/8 0/7 3/38 14/79 8/73
1997 6/16 1/7 2/10 1/8 0/7 1/38 11/86 8/84
1998 1/16 4/9 2/10 0/8 0/7 3/38 10/88 7/84
1999 0/16 2/9 0/10 0/8 1/7 6/39 9/89 10/84
2000 2/16 2/10 2/10 2/8 1/7 4/39 13/90 3/84
2001 2/15 0/9 0/10 0/8 0/7 3/38 5/87 11/84
2002 1/15 0/8 0/10 1/8 0/7 4/38 6/86 3/84
2003 2/15 0/8 1/10 3/9 0/8 2/38 8/88 4/84
2004 1/15 0/8 1/10 3/9 0/8 2/38 7/88 6/84
2005 0/15 1/8 1/10 2/9 0/7 3/38 7/87 2/84
2006 1/14 0/8 0/10 0/8 0/7 2/38 3/85 4/83
2007 0/13 0/8 0/10 1/7 1/7 2/35 4/80 3/82
2008 1/13 4/8 1/10 3/7 1/7 3/34 13/79 6/83
Total 56/414 14/101 43/357 31/292 31/259 100/1326 275/2749 228/2633
(%) 13.5% 13.9% 12.0% 10.6% 12.0% 7.5% 10.0% 8.7%
Notes: An extraordinary norm value is a value in the last decile in the developing sample –over
0.2896. For each region, the numerators are the sum of extraordinary norms (in each year).
Denominators represent the number of countries in the sample in each year.









3 ). Each of
these four values of Rj represents a point on the frontier of the feasible set deﬁned by the
trilemma. The ﬁrst three points represent the three corners corresponding to the “Hong
Kong,” “China,” and “U.S.” archetypes described above, and the last point represents
the “Middle” of the feasible frontier. Then, we deﬁne country i’s type in period t by its







That is, the observation’s type is deﬁned by the one that minimizes the distance between
the observation and the archetype.
Using this deﬁnition of assigned types, Figure 4 shows the number of economies in each
year of each type.11 By far the most common arrangement among developing economies
is the “China” type. In most years, more than forty economies have relatively stable
exchange rates and relative monetary sovereignty. Few developing economies exhibit much
ﬁnancial openness. With the exception of a very brief period right after the Asian Crisis,
fewer than two dozen economies fall into either the “Hong Kong” or “U.S.” categories.
The second most common arrangement type is the “Middle.” The number of “Middle”
observations brieﬂy peaked at nearly ﬁfty economies in the mid-nineties but more typically
there are closer to half of that number. Only relative to the brief peak can one say that
there has been any “hollowing out of the middle.” There has been no obvious migration
to any of the trilemma corners.
Table 5 summarizes how our measure of policy stability, the adjusted norm, diﬀers
across the four types of arrangements. As shown in the Table 5, policy stability diﬀers
markedly by type. For every type, one can strongly reject the hypothesis that the norm is
the same as for the remaining developing economies as a whole. Notably, the least stable
international macroeconomic policies occur when international macroeconomic arrange-
ments are most like the U.S. archetype: when exchange rates are ﬂexible and ﬁnancial
markets are open. The mean of the adjusted norm for this category is more than two
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Figure 4: Archetypes: Number of Countries
to three times larger than the mean for the “China” and “Hong Kong” categories, which
exhibit the most stability.
Figure 5 gives a richer picture of how stability changes over time for each of the types.
The four graphs display the adjusted norm for the four types over the sample. Keeping in
mind that the tallest spikes in the “Hong Kong” and “U.S.” types represent at most only
a handful of observations, we can see that even now the observations of economies with
the least ﬁnancial openness exhibit the most stable international macroeconomic policy.
Table 5: Norm using the Trilemma-Implied Monetary Sovereignty Measure
Mean Max. Min. St. Dev. Obs. H0
China 0.09 0.75 0.00 0.14 1507 5.52(***)
Hong Kong 0.06 0.71 0.00 0.13 210 3.88(***)
U.S. 0.19 0.88 0.00 0.20 203 −9.11(***)
Mid 0.11 0.74 0.00 0.14 829 −3.09(***)
Notes: The t-test reported in the last column is for the mean of the archetype against the mean
of the other observations in the developing sample. (*) denotes signiﬁcance at the 10% level; (**)
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Figure 5: Archetypes: Norm
5 Regressions
In this section, we use regressions to further explore the stability of the various inter-
national macroeconomic policy arrangements. First, we use a linear panel regression to
provide an overall perspective. Then, we use a probit model to examine how the likelihood
of large changes in policy varies with diﬀerent underlying arrangements. In these regres-
sions, we also examine the link between policy stability and oﬃcial holdings of foreign
exchange reserves.
Figure 6 motivates the inclusion of reserves in our assessment of policy stability. The
ﬁgure provides scatter plots of the adjusted norm (on the vertical axis) and the ratio of
foreign exchange reserves to GDP (on the horizontal axis). For the developing economies
as a whole, and for several of the regions (most notably Asia), the link between the two is

































































































Figure 6: Scatter Plots of Norm and Reserves (% GDP)
165.1 Linear Panel Regressions
Table 6 summarizes the linear panel regressions. We examine the link between the adjusted
norm and: the previous period’s oﬃcial foreign exchange reserves as a fraction of GDP
(which we denote ρi,t) and measures of the previous period’s international macroeconomic
arrangements.
The table includes two main speciﬁcations. The ﬁrst speciﬁcation regresses the ad-
justed norm on reserves, on the measures of exchange rate stability and ﬁnancial openness,
and on the interactions between reserves and the two measures. The second speciﬁcation
also regresses the adjusted norm on reserves, but instead of including the measures of
exchange rate stability and openness, it includes dummies for the economy’s international
macroeconomic arrangement type.
Speciﬁcally, the two linear panel speciﬁcations are:
ni,t = β0+β1ρi,t−1+β2Si,t−1+β3Fi,t−1+β4(Si,t−1−S)(ρi,t−1−ρ)+β5(Fi,t−1−F)(ρi,t−1−ρ)+￿i,t
(I)
ni,t = γ0 + γ1ρi,t−1 + γ2D“China”,i,t−1 + γ3D“HongKong”,i,t−1 + γ4D“U.S.”,i,t−1 + εi,t (II)
where overbars indicate sample means, and Dj indicates a dummy variable for typei,t =
Rj.12 Each of the two speciﬁcations is estimated with no eﬀects, with country eﬀects,
with time eﬀects, and with both country and time eﬀects; and, for all of regressions, both
simple OLS and cluster-robust standard errors are reported.13
The estimation results for both speciﬁcations provide additional documentation of the
link between exchange rate stability and overall stability within the trilemma, but the
two speciﬁcations show little support for the idea that reserves matter much for policy
stability.
In the ﬁrst speciﬁcation, the coeﬃcients on lagged reserves are statistically insigniﬁcant
12Note that the second speciﬁcation excludes R“Middle”.
13That is, the constants, β0 and γ0 are deﬁned sequentially as a simple constant, as a sum of country
eﬀects, as a sum of time eﬀects, and as a sum of both country and time eﬀects; and ￿i,t and εi,t are allowed












































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































18in all of the eight of speciﬁcations variants. There might at ﬁrst glance – seem to be some
indication that reserves are linked to stability in countries with ﬁxed exchange rates since
the coeﬃcients on their interaction with exchange rate stability are uniformly negative.
However, the magnitude of the coeﬃcients is underwhelming and their limited signiﬁcance
disappears with clustered errors. There does appear, though, to be a role for exchange rate
stability. In all eight versions of the ﬁrst speciﬁcation, the coeﬃcient on lagged exchange
rate stability itself is negative and statistically signiﬁcant, indicating that exchange rate
stability is robustly indicative of a lower adjusted norm in the subsequent period, that is,
it is indicative of overall stability within the trilemma policy space.
In the second speciﬁcation, the reserve coeﬃcients are again underwhelming, but all
of the archetype indicators are signiﬁcant at the ﬁve percent level or better, and most are
signiﬁcant at the one percent level. The coeﬃcients on the dummy for the China archetype
and the Hong-Kong archetype are both negative, indicating greater subsequent stability
(relative to the left-out “Middle” archetype); and the coeﬃcient on the U.S. archetype is
positive, indicating greater instability in the subsequent period.
The linear panel estimates conﬁrm our earlier assessment that policy stability varies
with the underlying international macroeconomic arrangements, and, despite the corre-
lations shown in Figure 6, they provide only the slightest evidence that reserves may be
systematically linked to trilemma stability. We explore both these issues in terms of large
policy changes in the section below.
5.2 Probit Regressions
In this section, we back away from the linear framework in order to focus on big policy
changes. Speciﬁcally, we turn our attention to whether an economy’s foreign exchange
reserves or its location in the trilemma policy space is linked to a greater probability of a
policy change that is large. Probit regressions are naturally suited to such questions, and
we use them here.
To implement the probit regressions, we deﬁne a large policy change as an adjusted
norm in the top decile, which in our sample means a value that exceeds 0.29. Deﬁning a
dependent variable that takes on a value of one when ni,t > 0.29, and takes on a value of
zero otherwise, we now can estimate a probit model using the same explanatory variables
19Table 7: Probit Estimates –Norm Implied by the Trilemma
Panel A Panel B Panel C
Spec. I Spec. II Spec. I Spec. II Spec. I Spec. II
Reserves (%GDP) −0.925 −0.82 −0.925 −0.82 −0.864 −0.932
(0.407)** (0.373)** (0.548)* (0.552) (0.479)* (0.456)**
Exchange Rate Stability −0.207 −0.207 −0.211
(0.105)** (0.134) (0.119)**
Financial Openness −0.024 −0.024 −0.152
(0.132) (0.213) (0.161)
Res. (%GDP) × E. R. S. −1.611 −1.611 −1.85
(1.144) (1.53) (1.276)
Res. (%GDP) × Fin. Op. 3.02 3.02 2.615
(1.186)** (1.676)* (1.368)*
China Archetype −0.099 −0.099 −0.127
(0.079) (0.08) (0.089)
Hong Kong Archetype −0.023 −0.023 −0.147
(0.147) (0.156) (0.168)
U.S. Archetype 0.508 0.508 0.546
(0.119)*** (0.113)*** (0.13)***
Constant −1.062 −1.199 −1.062 −1.199 −1.107 −1.226
(0.09)*** (0.072)*** (0.111)*** (0.078)*** (0.11)*** (0.093)***
LR 21.27*** 25.3***
Notes: Dependent variable is a discrete variable taking the value 1 if the norm is in the last decile
and 0 otherwise. Standard errors are in parentheses. Panel A reports simple probit estimates;
Panel B reports estimates with cluster-robust errors; and Panel C reports estimates from a probit
with random eﬀects. The interaction variables are expressed in deviation from the sample mean.
as in the two linear panel speciﬁcations above. Table 7 summarizes the estimation of the
probit regressions. The two speciﬁcations are each estimated with conventional standard
errors (Panel A), then with clustered errors (Panel B), then with random eﬀects (Panel
C).
Some evidence that foreign exchange reserves are linked to subsequent stability emerges
here. In ﬁve out of the six variants of the probit regression, the coeﬃcient on reserves is at
least mildly statistically signiﬁcant. Its sign is uniformly negative, indicating that greater
reserves relative to GDP are indicative of greater policy stability.14 The ﬁrst speciﬁcation,
which allows for interaction terms, adds something to the interpretation of the relationship
between reserves and stability. Notably, the interaction of reserves with ﬁnancial openness
has a positive, mildly signiﬁcant coeﬃcient. While not strongly signiﬁcant, this positive
interaction coeﬃcient nevertheless tells us that the link between reserves and stability is
14Unlike the linear models, the probit’s coeﬃcients are not immediately interpretable straight oﬀ the
page. However, an example gives an indication of the modest economic signiﬁcance of the coeﬃcient on
reserves: India increased its reserves from just under ten percent in 2001 to over 21 percent by 2008. The
coeﬃcients in Panels A and B imply that such a change would be tied to a decline in the likelihood of a
large policy change of about 22 percent.
20strongest when capital controls are in place.
The probit regressions also provide a degree of conﬁrmation of the links identiﬁed
above between the underlying trilemma policies and subsequent policy stability. In the
ﬁrst speciﬁcation, the coeﬃcients on exchange rate stability are uniformly negative, as
they were in the linear panel regressions, though they are no longer uniformly signiﬁcant.
As in the second speciﬁcation above, here the dummy for the “U.S.” archetype is positive
and strongly signiﬁcant in all three versions. This again suggests that, among develop-
ing economies, the least stable trilemma policies occur for those with relatively ﬂexible
exchange rates and open ﬁnancial markets.
6 Conclusions
Underlying this paper is a willingness to take the classic, open-economy trilemma seriously
and to draw out some of its implications for empirical work on international macroeconomic
policies. It is the simple geometry of the trilemma that provides us with a univariate gauge
of the stability of a country’s multidimensional, international macroeconomic policies.
Given existing measures of exchange rate stability and international ﬁnancial openness, it is
the trilemma’s constraint that provides us with an implicit gauge of monetary sovereignty.
It is the trilemma’s policy space that allows us to characterize international arrangements
in terms of their semblance to deﬁnitive policy archetypes.
Taking the trilemma seriously and using its implications, we explore the international
macroeconomic policies of a large group of developing economies. The results of this work
conﬁrm that most of the developing economies still remain closest to the archetype of ﬁxed
exchange rates and closed ﬁnancial markets. Among the developing economies in our sam-
ple, there has been – for example – no sustained “hollowing out of the middle.” Focusing
our attention on trilemma policy stability, we see that it is precisely the many ﬁnancially
closed economies with limited exchange rate ﬂexibility that tend to have the most stable
international macroeconomic policies. Finally, it is primarily in these ﬁnancially closed
economies that oﬃcial holdings of foreign exchange reserves seem to be linked, however
weakly, to greater policy stability.
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23A Appendix: Countries
The countries used in this paper are those for which Aizenman, Chinn and Ito (2010)
report data and have an annual per capita income of $3,855 or less (we are using the 2008
World Bank classiﬁcation).
• East Asia and Paciﬁc regional aggregate. Cambodia; China; Indonesia; Kiri-
bati; Lao PDR; Micronesia, Fed. Sts.; Mongolia; Myanmar; Papua New Guinea;
Philippines; Samoa; Solomon Islands; Thailand; Tonga; Vanuatu; Vietnam.
• Europe and Central Asia regional aggregate: Albania; Armenia; Azerbaijan;
Georgia; Kyrgyz Republic; Moldova; Tajikistan; Turkmenistan; Ukraine; Uzbek-
istan.
• Latin America and Caribbean regional aggregate. Belize; Bolivia; Ecuador;
El Salvador; Guatemala; Guyana; Haiti; Honduras; Nicaragua; Paraguay.
• Middle East and North Africa regional aggregate: Djibouti; Egypt, Arab
Rep.; Iran, Islamic Rep.; Iraq; Jordan; Morocco; Syrian Arab Republic; Tunisia;
Yemen, Rep.
• South Asia regional aggregate. Afghanistan; Bangladesh; Bhutan; India; Mal-
dives; Nepal; Pakistan; Sri Lanka.
• Sub-Saharan Africa regional aggregate. Angola; Benin(*); Burkina Faso(*);
Burundi; Cameroon(*); Cape Verde; Central African Republic(*); Chad(*); Co-
moros; Congo, Dem. Rep.; Congo, Rep.(*); Cˆ ote d’Ivoire(*); Eritrea; Ethiopia;
Gambia, The; Ghana; Guinea; Guinea-Bissau(*); Kenya; Lesotho; Liberia; Mada-
gascar; Malawi; Mali(*); Mauritania; Mozambique; Niger(*); Nigeria; Rwanda; S˜ ao
Tom´ e and Pr´ ıncipe; S´ en´ egal(*); Sierra Leone; Somalia; Sudan; Swaziland; Tanzania;
Togo(*); Uganda; Zambia; Zimbabwe.
Note: (*) indicates a member state of the Communaut´ e fran¸ caise d’Afrique.











Afghanistan 21 0 7 1 29
Albania 2 0 11 1 14
Angola 8 0 6 2 16
Armenia 0 0 9 4 13
Azerbaijan 10 0 3 0 13
Bangladesh 30 0 3 0 33
Belize 13 1 10 0 24
Benin* 13 0 17 0 30
Bhutan 24 0 0 0 24
Bolivia 1 14 20 4 39
Burkina Faso* 13 0 8 0 21
Burundi 24 0 15 0 39
Cambodia 8 0 8 0 16
Cameroon* 23 0 16 0 39
Cape Verde 26 0 1 0 27
Central African Republic* 29 0 10 0 39
Chad* 31 0 8 0 39
China 21 0 3 1 25
Comoros 28 0 0 0 28
Congo, Dem. Rep. 9 0 9 13 31
Congo, Rep. 34 0 5 0 39
Cˆ ote d’Ivoire* 23 0 16 0 39
Djibouti 0 27 0 0 27











Ecuador 3 5 24 7 39
Egypt, Arab Rep. 26 6 4 3 39
El Salvador 23 13 3 0 39
Eritrea 9 0 1 1 11
Ethiopia 39 0 0 0 39
Gambia, The 11 0 12 15 38
Georgia 0 0 7 6 13
Ghana 34 0 5 0 39
Guatemala 10 8 18 3 39
Guinea 28 0 7 2 37
Guinea-Bissau* 12 0 14 2 28
Guyana 22 8 6 3 39
Haiti 1 6 13 12 32
Honduras 11 11 17 0 39
India 35 0 4 0 39
Indonesia 0 18 10 11 39
Iran, Islamic Rep. 24 2 12 1 39
Iraq 30 0 4 0 34
Jordan 14 12 13 0 39
Kenya 22 0 11 6 39
Kiribati 0 16 0 0 16
Kyrgyz Republic 0 0 7 5 12
Lao PDR 23 0 8 3 34
Lesotho 27 0 10 0 37
Liberia 1 16 12 10 39











Madagascar 16 0 19 4 39
Malawi 19 0 19 1 39
Maldives 0 17 5 5 27
Mali* 17 0 22 0 39
Mauritania 33 0 6 0 39
Micronesia, Fed. Sts. 0 13 0 0 13
Moldova 8 0 4 1 13
Mongolia 1 0 9 4 14
Morocco 35 0 4 0 39
Mozambique 17 0 4 0 21
Myanmar 30 0 9 0 39
Nepal 35 0 4 0 39
Nicaragua 14 21 2 2 39
Niger* 26 0 13 0 39
Nigeria 28 0 9 2 39
Pakistan 32 0 7 0 39
Papua New Guinea 2 0 27 1 30
Paraguay 20 0 11 8 39
Philippines 16 0 19 4 39
Rwanda 27 0 10 2 39
Samoa 21 0 13 0 34
S˜ ao Tom´ e and Pr´ ıncipe 10 0 14 4 28
S´ en´ egal* 16 0 23 0 39
Sierra Leone 25 0 5 9 39
Solomon Islands 11 0 15 1 27











Somalia 20 0 1 0 21
Sri Lanka 17 0 18 4 39
Sudan 28 0 7 3 38
Swaziland 16 0 20 0 36
Syrian Arab Republic 36 0 0 0 36
Tajikistan 7 0 5 0 12
Tanzania 22 0 16 1 39
Thailand 1 0 36 2 39
Togo* 34 0 5 0 39
Tonga 3 0 16 1 20
Tunisia 30 0 9 0 39
Turkmenistan 6 0 0 0 6
Uganda 17 1 12 9 39
Ukraine 9 0 3 1 13
Uzbekistan 2 0 0 0 2
Vanuatu 0 0 12 4 16
Vietnam 31 0 1 0 32
Yemen, Rep. 0 5 6 0 11
Zambia 17 0 7 13 37
Zimbabwe 19 0 1 3 23
All 1570 220 855 205 2850
28